



 Emily R. Douglas 2015 
ISSN: 1832-5203 




Foucault, Laughter, and Gendered Normalization* 
Emily R. Douglas, McGill University 
 
ABSTRACT: Thus far, little attention has been paid by Foucauldian scholars to the role of 
laughter in our subjectivation and normalization, nor to the possible roles of laughter practices 
in political resistance. Yet, there is a body of references to laughter in both Foucault’s own 
work and that of his contemporary commentators, subtly indicating that it might be a tool for 
challenging normalization through transgression. I seek to negotiate the different functions 
(both transgressive and disciplinary) that our laughter practices can have, proposing that 
laughter is a worthy site of exploration for Foucauldian feminists in particular. Examining the 
differential norms, requirements, and sanctions around laughter shows that we are shaped as 
gendered subjects through the regulation of laughter’s timing and its bodily presentation. I 
argue that the contemporary state of laughter practices works to uphold docile femininity, 
using tools such as compulsory happiness and labelling feminists as killjoys. In brief, this arti-
cle interrogates the ways in which cultivating different laughter practices can function as a 
path for Foucauldian-feminist political resistance. 
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Near the end of The Order of Things, Foucault states that “to all those who still wish to talk 
about man, about his reign or liberation, to all those who still ask themselves questions about 
what man is in his essence [….] we can answer only with a philosophical laugh—which 
means, to a certain extent, a silent one.” 1 This paper considers the political functions of laugh-
ter within the context of a Foucauldian framework. I figure laughter as a valuable phenome-
non for Foucauldian theorists and specifically for Foucauldian feminists to analyse, despite its 
absence from the foreground of Foucault’s own work. First, I will argue that laughter is re-
vealed as significant when placed within Foucauldian frameworks of power and politics. Sec-
ond, I argue that Foucauldian feminists in particular should attend to laughter’s disciplinary 
                                                 
* I would like to thank Dr. Cressida Heyes and Dr. Chloë Taylor for their extensive help on early versions 
of this material, as well as Dr. Margaret McLaren and Dr. Dianna Taylor for their many comments in refin-
ing it, and Foucault Studies’ two anonymous referees for their extremely helpful constructive suggestions.  
1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Random House, 
1970), 342-3. 
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and resistant functions. To do so, I build upon the work of the many Foucauldian feminists 
who have analyzed practices of normalization and proposed sites of resistance, as well as 
draw from contemporary feminists outside of the Foucauldian tradition. I hope to show that 
laughter practices have untapped subversive and resistant potential. The guiding question of 
my paper is: how might we use laughter practices to transgress the limits of our current expe-
rience as gendered laughing subjects? 
The key moves in this paper are as follows: I perform a close reading of some of Fou-
cault’s references to laughter (and commentary on them by feminist scholars) and relate them 
to the concepts of transgression and discourse; I examine how laughter is both a normalizing 
force and itself normalized, particularly upon gendered bases; and I explore what it could 
mean for feminists to ‘laugh differently’ as a mode of resistance.  
 
I. Foucault’s laughter 
Although Foucault gives neither an explanation nor a genealogy of laughter, he does mention 
it several times. Most famously, he begins The Order of Things by explaining that the book first 
arose  
 
out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the 
familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age 
and our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces […] and continuing long after-
wards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and 
the Other. […] In the wonderment of [Borges’ fictional taxonomy of animals], the thing we 
apprehend in one great leap […] is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of think-
ing that. 2 
 
This is a shocking moment for Foucault as a reader. Later, in his 1974 lecture series Abnormal, 
he notes that “discourses of truth that provoke laughter and have the institutional power to 
kill are, after all, in a society like ours, discourses that deserve some attention. […] These eve-
ryday discourses of truth that kill and provoke laughter are at the very heart of our judicial 
system.”3 In line with these comments from Abnormal and The Order of Things, Chloë Taylor 
argues that many of Foucault’s non-philosophical publications, such as memoirs and appen-
dices, are examples of such “everyday discourses of truth” that function to create laughter in 
the reader.4 Taylor takes the laughs of readers to be significant, adding that “the work of dis-
cipline also works at the level of the body and thus can be undone only through the body, 
through shifts in its pleasures and affects and practices, and not merely through the ac-
ceptance or examination of philosophical ideas.”5 
                                                 
2 Foucault, The Order of Things, xv. 
3 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975, edited by Valerino Marchetti and 
Antonella Salomoni, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2004), 6.  
4 Chloë Taylor, The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault: A Genealogy of the ‘Confessing Animal’ 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 135. 
5 Ibid. 
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As a third example, laughs litter many of Foucault’s interview transcripts.6 During 
what was published as “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” James O’ Higgins asks Foucault whether 
lesbians desire relationships similar to the long-term stable heterosexual relationship, in con-
trast with gay men.7 Foucault responds by laughing and then saying, “All I can do is explode 
with laughter.” In her discussion of this interview in Gender Trouble, Judith Butler suggests 
that Foucault laughs “precisely because the question instates the very binary that he seeks to 
displace”; it came loaded with an understanding of sexuality that he did not accept.8 
These references don’t constitute an argument, but they are evidence that Foucault con-
sidered laughter to be significant and political. How should we think about laughter, given 
these mentions of it in Foucault’s writing and life (as well as their uptake by feminist theo-
rists)? There are two functions of laughter here that I want to highlight. First, laughter can 
function, as it does in at least the first example, to desubjectivate the person who is laughing. 
Anne Parvulescu speculates that this laughter is something that happens to the subject: “It is 
not Foucault […] who laughs. […] Laughter laughs Foucault’s thought. […] Foucault is disap-
propriated; his thought is not his property. He is at the mercy of laughter, engulfed in laugh-
ter.”9 Second, laughter bears some sort of edge relationship to discourse. Laughing is not ex-
actly discursive, but neither is it wholly divergent; in these examples discourses provoke laugh-
ter. Furthermore, the fact that they provoke laughter is not an accidental correlation but an 
indication of something about the discourse itself. 
I would like to situate these instances of laughter within Foucault’s discussion of trans-
gression. Transgression is a concept that he defines in contrast to dialectics/dialectical philoso-
phy.10 In his view, dialectical philosophy conceives of resistance as direct negative opposition 
to an external object or force, with both the resistance and the force having a shared back-
ground/set of assumptions. Dialectics take for granted the conceptual schema or paradigm 
within which the debate is happening, and so dialectical challenges dispute the internal work-
ings of a system rather than the framework itself. If we wish to perform an overhaul of a polit-
ical system, in contrast, we need to alter our conception of resistance. I suggest that we can 
take up Foucault’s notion of transgression as a resource for developing different forms of re-
sistance. 
In transgression, instead of accepting the limits of our current discourses and episteme, 
we expose them as contingent. Transgressing, therefore, involves fundamentally challenging 
the terms, concepts, and discourses that structure our daily lives. However, transgression 
                                                 
6 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, edited by Sylvere Lotringer, translated by 
Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996). 
7 Michel Foucault, “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), Michel Foucault: Ethics, Subjectivity, 
and Truth (New York: New Press, 1997), 163-73.  
8 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1991), 140. 
9 Anca Parvulescu, Laughter: Notes on a Passion (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), 
13. 
10 Michel Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” in Donald F. Bouchard (ed. and Trans.), Language, Coun-
ter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); Michel Foucault, 
“What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York: Pantheon, 1984). 
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must be a constant and dynamic project, since Foucault would argue that it is never the case 
that we discover some ultimate, universal a priori concept underneath. Rather, any way of 
thinking is constructed and contingent. In this movement, the boundaries we typically hold 
are revealed as impermanent and porous—challenging not only our categories, but our sense 
of self. Our subjectivity is, as it were, shattered. 
We can transgress in at least two ways. The first is by interrogating our own limits 
through critical philosophy, doing “a historico-practical test of the limits that we may go be-
yond” critiquing and understanding our historical limits, and how we define ourselves by 
specific historical events.11 Second, transgression can happen to us as a limit experience. A limit 
experience is distinctive because “[n]o form of dialectical movement, no analysis of constitu-
tions and of their transcendental ground can serve as support for thinking about such an expe-
rience or even as access to this experience.”12 In other words, a limit experience is neither intel-
ligible nor fully expressible within our discourses. Limit experiences range from the extreme, 
drug-induced, and sexually explicit to the ‘mundane’ and everyday, like Foucault’s experience 
of reading Borges, or perhaps our own of reading Foucault.  
I find it helpful to compare Foucault’s concept of transgression to Ladelle McWhorter’s 
concept of “opposition.” In Bodies and Pleasures, she reserves the term “resistance” for dialec-
tics, stating that resistance “is merely negative, a no to domination. Opposition involves some-
thing positive, a departure from dominating networks […] the production of a different sort of 
self and a different sort of community.”13 In addition to this distinction between types of re-
sistance, McWhorter not only acknowledges but insists that transgression or opposition has 
conditions of possibility. In order to be able to transgress, we often first need to enact some 
dialectical resistance, a violent “counterattack” against practices and institutions “to force 
them to allow us to do our self-transformative work.”14 This distinction is helpful when think-
ing about what instances of laughter practices are resistant, and how they can work together. 
 The three laughs I started with can be understood as either instances of transgression 
or as the dialectical work that often precedes transgression. Classifying them as either dialecti-
cal or transgressive laughs is vague and messy; even in cases when laughter might seem to be 
dialectical (as in the O’Higgins example), we can trouble such a classification. Foucault’s laugh 
at that moment not only critiqued what O’Higgins said, but refused to engage with the dis-
course (thus, the assumed backdrop of the conversation). I will put my energy, however, not 
only into categorizing specific instances of laughter as dialectical or transgressive, but primari-
ly into interrogating the transgressive potential of the examples. To do only this, however, 




                                                 
11 Ibid., 42, 47. 
12 Ibid., 37. 
13 Ladelle McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures: Foucault and the Politics of Sexual Normalization (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1999), 191. 
14 Ibid., 191. 
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II. Laughter and Normalization 
The examples of laughter I cite above show Foucault speaking of laughter not as a set of prac-
tices that is normalized, but as a potentially resistant force.15 However, I contend that it is a 
highly normalized and normalizing phenomenon, in particular as it relates to gender. In order 
to demonstrate this, I will expand upon Sandra Bartky’s analysis of discipline as it applies to 
‘contemporary’ femininity—using disciplinary power, and its primary mechanisms of surveil-
lance and normalization, as my framework.16 
Bartky famously explicitly connects femininity and docility, arguing that femininity is 
disciplined through control of women’s body shape, decoration, and “gestures, postures, and 
movements.”17 How does laughter interact with docility and femininity? I hold that moments 
of laughter, and the ways that we laugh, often either stem from or function to reproduce doc-
ile femininity.  
I contend that much laughter today is a normalizing, disciplinary force. Laughter can 
reinforce norms of appearance, of disciplinary boundaries, and of oppression. When we fail to 
meet a norm we may be subject to ridicule: for example, laughter normalizes those who don’t 
perform gender ‘properly’ or ‘normally.’ Several scholars have proposed that in the mouths of 
the sexist and racist majority, laughter works to maintain oppression rather than challenge it.18 
The phenomenon of ‘laughing-at’ even extends to disciplinary boundaries in another sense: 
Women’s and Gender Studies is commonly presented as “risible [i.e. laughable], something 
that the students should not take too seriously, in contrast to […] other approaches mentioned, 
all of them presented in a balanced, admiring and non-mocking tone.”19 This laughter keeps 
gender studies at the margins, distancing it from other disciplines and isolating it as non-
scholarly.  
However, laughter does not only work as a tool to support other normalizing practices; 
laughter itself as a practice is normalized. There are ‘normal’ ways to laugh, which vary accord-
ing to many factors, such as class, race, and gender. Many sociological and psychological stud-
                                                 
15 Just as Foucault held that resistance is often generated by the exercise of power itself, we can view invol-
untary resistant laughter as a result of laughter’s thorough normalization. 
16 Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vin-
tage, 1977). 
17 Sandra Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and Patriarchal Power,” in Lee Quinby and Irene Diamond (eds.), 
Feminism and Foucault: Paths of Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1988), 65; Bartky also ob-
serves that “a woman must not allow her arms and legs to flail about in all directions; she must try to man-
age her movement with the appearance of grace” (Ibid., 69). These tactics and comportments are “part of 
the process by which the ideal body of femininity—and hence the feminine body-subject—is constructed” 
(Ibid., 71). 
18 Michael Billig, Laughter and Ridicule: Towards a Social Critique of Humour (London: Sage, 2005); Diana Elena 
Popa and Villy Tsakona, “Humour in politics and the politics of humour: An introduction,” in Diana Elena 
Popa and Villy Tsakona (eds.), Studies in Political Humour: In Between Political Critique and Public Entertain-
ment (Philadelphia: John Benjamin, 2011). 
19 Maria do Mar Pereira, “Dangerous laughter: the mocking of Gender Studies in academia,” OpenDemocra-
cy.net (March 8, 2013). Available online at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/maria-do-mar-
pereira/dangerous-laughter-mocking-of-gender-studies-in-academia 
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ies note laughter’s gendered trends: women laugh more often than men, and more often at 
men’s jokes, though rarely at men; men find women more attractive the more they laugh; and 
while women laugh with a high-pitched voice, men emit more grunts.20 On my interpretation, 
these differences are not innate but reflect significant ways through which femininity and 
masculinity are constructed and lived. I assert that the normalization of women, and thus part 
of their constitution as gendered subjects, takes place through the disciplining of their laugh-
ter. There are two major ways in which women’s laughter is disciplined: its form is governed 
down to small details, and its timing is regulated.  
Iris Marion Young, in her phenomenology of women’s’ comportment, argues that there 
is a “typical style of running like a girl, climbing like a girl, swinging like a girl, [and] hitting 
like a girl.”21 I insist that there is a distinctive way of laughing like a girl produced through dis-
cipline and normalization.22 The gendered differences between giggling and guffawing, or 
laughing with your body still and knee-slapping, reflect norms of feminine embodiment. 
Women who don’t meet these norms—who move around too much, slap their knees, clap 
hands, shake shoulders, embrace a belly laugh, make too much noise, or laugh too long—are 
deemed unfeminine or abnormal. Furthermore, the enforcement of these norms is performed 
by everyone and no one, including one’s self.23 For example, in August of 2015 a book club 
made up primarily of black women was evacuated from Napa Valley Wine Train in California 
because a white passenger complained that they were laughing too loudly, prompting discus-
sion about the dangers associated with #laughingwhileblack.24  
Laughter plays into gender normalization in a second way: laughter is often compulso-
ry. Feminists and critical race theorists have argued that commonly, oppressed individuals are 
required to appear happy, docile, and upbeat as a way of showing deference to those in pow-
er.25 Sara Ahmed focuses this concern upon what she calls ‘compulsory happiness,’ arguing 
                                                 
20 Jo-Anne Bachorowski, Moria J. Smoski, and Michal J. Owren, “The acoustic features of human laughter,” 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, vol. 110, no. 3 (2001); E. Bressler and S. Balshine, “The influence of 
humor on desirability,” Evolution and Human Behavior, vol. 27 (2006); K. Grammer and I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
“The ritualization of laughter,” in W. Koch (ed.), Naturlichkeit der sprache und der kultur: Actacolloquii (Bo-
chum: Brockmeyer, 1990); Robert Provine, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation (New York: Viking Penguin, 
2000). These studies are culturally and socially bound, the majority using young college students in the 
United States and Canada as their subjects. 
21 Iris Marion Young, “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment Motility 
and Spatiality,” Human Studies, vol. 3 (1980), 143. 
22 This does not negate other ways of ‘laughing like a girl.’ See Chisholm for a theorization of a liberating 
way of ‘climbing like a girl.’ Dianne Chisholm, “Climbing like a Girl: An Exemplary Adventure in Feminist 
Phenomenology,” Hypatia, vol. 23, no. 1 (2008). 
23 Bartky’s and Young’s analyses are situated in twentieth-century, white ‘Western’ Anglophone middle-
class society, and are both now several decades old. I believe that on the whole their analyses apply today, 
though a more nuanced analysis of how comportment is influenced by racialized and queer identities is 
needed. 
24 Eliora Katz, “Black Women Kicked Off Wine Train For Laughing Too Loudly,” The Daily Beast (August 
24, 2015). Available online at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/24/black-women-kicking-off-
wine-train-for-laughing-too-loudly.html 
25 Laura Green, “Stereotypes: Negative Racial Stereotypes and Their Effect on Attitudes Toward African-
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that women are held to a higher standard of performing happiness than their male counter-
parts.26 Compulsory happiness does not express one’s own delight or joy, but is a duty a 
woman bears to others. Ahmed states that “happiness is not so much what the [happy house-
wife archetype] has but what she does,” so that “any deviation from gender roles in terms of 
women being trained to make men happy is a deviation from the happiness of all.”27 The 
norms of compulsory happiness have prompted backlash, as evidenced by movements such as 
Tatyana Fazlalizadeh’s series of posters entitled “Stop Telling Women to Smile.”28 This series 
consists of portraits of victims of street harassment, featuring women of colour in order to 
highlight the differing forms of street harassment that are plied against them and the addi-
tional pressure on racialized women to perform happiness. 
Alongside the demand for smiles comes what I will call compulsory laughter. Examples 
of compulsory laughter are present in our daily lives: a woman might be expected to laugh 
when someone with power over her makes a joke, to treat her own achievements as ridicu-
lous, or to ‘laugh off’ street harassment. The ideal woman must laugh in order to facilitate the 
laughter and happiness of all those around her: refraining from laughter lets others down. 
This functions not only to please men, but to please other women: for example, a female em-
ployer might expect her nanny to laugh along with her. In complying, the employee would 
both ‘prove’ her affective bond to the employer and ‘prove’ her own satisfaction in her job. In 
each case, compulsory laughter is part of a woman’s responsibility for all others’ happiness 
above her own. The pleasing of privileged subjects has a dual role here, since it also reinforces 
norms of femininity linked to selflessness, nurturing, martyrdom, hyper-politeness, subservi-
ence, and docility.  
Both of these modes of laughter regulation—the control of its expression and of its tim-
ing—normalize us as gendered subjects. For example, the mocking of individuals who fall 
outside of the gender binaries (or who even perform gender-subversive acts) is a “laughing-
at” whose goals is to punish these individuals and force them back into ‘normalcy.’ Further-
more, how we laugh results in others reading our gender(s) in a certain way, as more ‘proper-
ly’ feminine or masculine, and as more or less rational.29 The regulations around women’s laughter 
function to support and construct an unrealistic archetype of femininity: docile, subservient, and self-
less above all else.30 The degree to which one’s laughter is successfully normalized has ripple 
effects in terms of heterosexual desirability, competency in the workplace, and possibilities for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Americans,” Perspectives on Multiculturalism and Cultural Diversity, vol. 11, no. 1 (1998). Web: 
http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/links/VCU.htm 
26 Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).  
27 Ibid., 55. Furthermore, Provine speculates that laughter is regularly “performed by a subservient individ-
ual, most often a female, as a vocal display of compliance, subordination, or solidarity with a more domi-
nant group member” (Provine, Laughter: A Scientific Investigation, 29).  
28 Tatyana Fazlalizadeh, ”About,” Stop Telling Women to Smile. Available online at: 
http://stoptellingwomentosmile.com/About 
29 Women, and other subjects stereotyped as more “bodily” and less “rational,” are often expected to cover 
their mouths, restrain their limbs, and laugh quietly. 
30 Examining laughter reveals the inconsistencies of these norms of femininity, and the delicate balance nec-
essary for a subject to approximate them. 




III. Un/Laughter as Resistance 
How then can we reconcile these normalizing and gendering functions of laughter with the 
transgressive functions that I have laid out so far? An explicit example of women taking up 
laughter as anti-normalization occurred during the summer of 2014. After the Turkish prime 
minister decried women laughing in public, many Turkish women began the #direnkahkaha 
(‘resist laughter’) movement, posting photos of their own public laughter on social media in 
protest.31 In addition to this instance of an explicitly trangressive/anti-normalizing use of 
laughter, I therefore outline three more subtle ways in which laughter can produce anti-
normalizing effects: i) laughing when we usually wouldn’t; ii) changing our comportment 
during laughter; and iii) disrupting compulsory laughter (unlaughing). Accomplishing these 
practices in non-disciplinary ways is certainly tricky, as there are no clear rules. Because femi-
nine laughter is at times demanded and at other times prohibited, resistance will be contextual 
rather than systematic.32 I thus aim to aid the reader in thinking through new laughter practic-
es, or what I will call ‘laughing differently.’ How are women already (thinking about) laugh-
ing differently? 
Women laughing when we are disciplined not to can be powerful in countering nor-
malizing discourse. Nisha Susan suggests that ‘feminist laughter’ can be a key response to 
openly sexist or otherwise offensive jokes.33 Laughing sarcastically might be effective in inter-
rupting the norms of joke-telling, in particular if you laugh at the joke-teller. However, if your 
laughter isn’t hyperbolic enough (and there is no clear bar to hit), it might be interpreted as 
complicity. The LOL @ MRA blog is “dedicated to laughing at the ridiculous things ‘Men’s 
Rights Activists’ say and believe.”34 A close friend told me that she “once laughed in the face 
of a philosopher who told [her] that he always wondered what sex with a feminist would be 
like.” Laughter in the form of mocking is also being used already by many women in order to 
deflect assault. Susan proposes we use a “warning laugh” against men who expose themselves 
or grope others in public. An academic mentioned to me that the tactic of laughing at an of-
fender was taught to her as a strategy for public humiliation and recruiting bystanders. Hélène 
Cixous, among others, has pointed out that women’s laughter is seen as a danger that must be 
quelled else it fatally damage masculinity: “it’s a question of submitting feminine disorder, its 
laughter, its inability to take the drumbeats seriously, to the threat of decapitation.35 In these 
examples, laughter involves a non-discursive refusal, but can also function to discipline others 
to conform to current social norms (for example, the norm prohibiting public exposure). Alt-
                                                 
31 EsmaAkyel, “#Direnkahkaha (Resist Laughter): ‘Laughter is a Revolutionary Action’,” Feminist Media 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 6 (2014). 
32 See also Cynthia Willett, Julie Willett, and Yael D. Sherman, “The Seriously Erotic Politics of Feminist 
Laughter,” Social Research, vol. 79, no. 1 (2012). 
33 Nisha Susan, “So you thought feminists don’t laugh?” The Times of India: Crest Edition (April 13, 2013). 
Available online at: http://www.timescrest.com/coverstory/so-you-thought-feminists-dont-laugh-10118 
34 LOL @ MRA, Tumblr.com. Accessed January 22, 2014. Available online at: http://lolatmra.tumblr.com. 
35 Hélène Cixous, "Castration or Decapitation?" translated by A. Kuhn, Signs, vol. 7, no. 1 (1981), 42-3.  
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hough these laughs are disciplinary and perhaps dialectical, they are both useful for combat-
ing micro-aggressions and make room for transgression to occur.36 
We can also change how we laugh. Allowing our bodies and voices to have free rein 
during laughter can counteract many of the pressures that Bartky and Young identified.37 
Laughter can be a way of taking up space: either physically by moving your limbs or by pro-
jecting your voice loudly across the space. Laughing in gender-nonconforming ways, or doing 
so intentionally, makes others aware of the contingency of norms. Alternatively, we can laugh 
in a hyper-feminine, exaggerated manner. As Bordo and McWhorter point out, women are 
asked to control their ‘hysterical’ natures to gain proper or accepted femininity.38 In the face of 
this, laughing hysterically could be a feminist act, as it is excessive, loud, and lacks the defined 
control of posture and movements. Accomplishing these changes in our micro-practices, 
though, is entangled with the problem of habit. I will return to this task in a later section, pro-
posing laughing differently as an askesis.  
Feminists have also been addressing compulsory laughter, some under the umbrella of 
‘killjoys.’ The feminist killjoy stereotype persists in part because practices of unlaughter have 
already been taken up.39 Social scientist Michael Billig coined the term ‘unlaughter,’ which I 
borrow here, to mean “a display of not laughing when laughter might otherwise be expected, 
hoped for or demanded.”40 There are a myriad of ways to unlaugh. You might remain silent in 
the face of a normally accepted joke or comment, having a lack of reaction “speak for itself.” 
However, in certain contexts silence implies complicity, and so it is necessary to verbally point 
out our own lack of laughter.41 Bell hooks experienced this at a viewing of the drag-ball docu-
mentary Paris is Burning (1990). She and her friend were: 
 
disturbed by the extent to which white folks around us were ‘entertained’ and ‘pleasured’ by 
scenes we viewed as sad and at times tragic. Often individuals laughed at personal testimo-
ny about hardship, pain, loneliness. Several times I yelled out in the dark: ‘What is so funny 
about this scene? Why are you laughing?’ The laughter was never innocent.42 
 
Unlaughing interrupts what individuals might ‘normally’ see as funny, exposing the presup-
positions behind laughter and showing that humour itself is contingent. In hooks’ example, 
                                                 
36 Microaggressions are “the everyday verbal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, 
whether intentional or unintentional, which communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages to tar-
get persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership” (Derald Wing Sue, “Microaggres-
sions: More than Just Race,” Psychology Today (November 17, 2010). Available online at: 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/microaggressions-in-everyday-life/201011/microaggressions-
more-just-race 
37 Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and Patriarchal Power”; Young, “Throwing Like a Girl.” 
38 Susan Bordo, Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2003, 10th anniversary ed.); McWhorter, Bodies and Pleasures.  
39 Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, 87. Billig, Laughter and Ridicule, 192. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 193. 
42 Bell hooks, “Is Paris Burning?” in Black Looks: Race and Representation (Boston: South End Press, 1992), 154. 
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the audience’s laughter was only possible due to their already privileged standpoint.  
As several scholars have pointed out, the examples that Foucault gives of resistance in 
his own work are not per se ‘successful’ or ‘satisfactory.’ For example, Foucault’s College de 
France lectures Psychiatric Power and Abnormal illustrate some moments of collective and in-
voluntary resistance which were imported into the systems of power and ultimately used to 
strengthen the organizations (nuns and hysterics).43 The worry that instances of resistance can 
result in punishment or worsening of situations for individuals involved is, therefore, a real 
and legitimate concern for Foucauldians invested in political revolution.44 
Just as Foucault’s work demonstrates that resistance has no guarantee of success, there 
are risks to all these strategies of ‘laughing differently’: unlaughing might mean further dis-
missal as a killjoy, or, as in hooks’ case, as an ‘angry-black-woman’; laughing inexplicably 
might mean the ascription of total irrationality, particularly in academic or formal political 
spaces; and changing our tone of voice or posture might result in sanctions for violating gen-
der-binarist norms. Social consequences abound with any of these. Embarking on the project 
of laughing differently, then, may be impossible for many women and most accessible only for 
those who already hold significant privileges in other aspects of their lives. Furthermore, as 
Bartky acknowledges, giving up some of the practices that constitute our gender can result in 
a lost identity for many individuals—the prospect of losing the self is a particularly terrifying 
one for contemporary subjects.45 
Another hurdle is determining how we cultivate different laughter. In particular, how 
do we cultivate spontaneous or non-intentional laughter? Involuntary, spontaneous laughter 
is what comes through most clearly in the references from Foucault’s work. However, this is a 
tricky path to take to resistance, since we cannot directly will it to happen—leaving agents to 
feel powerless, and resistance dependent upon contingent whims of fate that may or may not 
occur. As any limit experience, it is impossible to predict or 100% manipulate the occurrence of 
transgressive laughter—even though we can try and cultivate an open environment. I propose 
that individuals might develop an ongoing cultivation of conditions for possibility of sponta-
neous, unbridled laughter.  
 
IV. Our laughter, our selves 
Laughter that functions through transgression, then, can be useful for feminist politics. Laugh-
ter and unlaughter might be part of a project of transgression through critique, incorporated 
into everyday actions. For example, refusing to laugh at a socially sanctioned moment can be a 
way of pointing out the demand for compulsory laughter, the norms around comportment in 
laughter, and oppressive assumptions in humour. Laughing on purpose or intentionally can 
                                                 
43 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974, edited by Jacques Lagrange 
et al., translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2006) 137, 253, and 254; Foucault, Abnormal, 222, 
and 227.  
44 These examples don’t rule out resistance, however; in particular these two examples were highly institu-
tionally-focused, whereas laughter is one of the more diffuse and disparate of examples that suffuse non-
institutional contexts. 
45 Bartky, “Foucault, Femininity, and Patriarchal Power,” 77. 
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also be a way of invoking critique: it can expose the limits of rationality (and its insufficiency) 
while also reminding reason of its contingent, embodied form.  
In particular, feminists can use transgressive laughter to shatter categories and con-
cepts that have been used for oppression. Butler explicitly suggests that “laughter in the face 
of serious categories [such as the medicalization of women’s bodies] is indispensable for femi-
nism” (my emphasis).46 In Beauvoir’s view, for the girl “scoffing at the female body, ridiculing 
men, [and] laughing at love, are ways of disavowing sexuality; this laughter that defies adults 
is a way of overcoming one’s own embarrassment; one plays with images and words to kill 
the dangerous magic of them.”47 These categories break up not only when we explicitly dis-
cuss them and laugh (as in Foucault’s interview mentioned earlier), but also more subtly; 
changing the ways that I laugh may provide me with a different lived experience of my own 
gendered embodiment.  
Instead of establishing new rules for how feminists “should” laugh, I propose that we 
experiment with transgressive laughter to highlight the contingency of norms and practices, 
while avoiding positing new normalizing standards. Laughing differently can be a project of 
care of the self, by which we transform our subjectivities. Foucault demonstrates the ethical 
potential of self-transformation in The History of Sexuality volume 3: The Care of the Self.48 He ad-
dresses forms of assujettissement that do not result in docility or normalization through the ex-
ample of the “care of the self”: practices (and arguably a way of life) performed in ancient 
Greece. In brief, he argues that whereas in the twentieth century, Western societies thought 
about the self as something to know and/or discover, the ancient Greeks saw the self as some-
thing developed through caring for it. This care often involved governance, strict regimens, 
and training, around aspects of life such as sexual activity, diet, and physical exercise, but was 
not normalizing. 49 
Foucault divides a regimen of care of the self into askeses, or ‘technologies of the self,’ 
actions that:  
 
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfec-
tion, or immortality.50 
 
One ancient askesis that Foucault explores is parrhesia (frank speech), a form of truth-telling 
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that changes your self-relation: you come to see yourself as one who speaks the truth, rather 
than being defined in terms of your status. In parrhesia “access to the truth entails exercising 
freedom [as a speaking subject] and doing so, moreover, in ways that both generate and pro-
mote confrontation with uncertainty and risk.”51 Today, many Foucauldians are searching for 
alternative askeses, taking parrhesia and dietetics as models for ethics. In particular, several 
Foucauldian feminists examine the micro-practices of power and resistance in our ordinary 
activities, considering practices as diverse as gardening, line-dancing, cosmetic surgery, body-
building and grassroots anti-rape campaigns.52 Although these acts might seem very minor, 
Dianna Taylor holds that:  
 
Foucault is trying to get us to see […] the potential of seemingly mundane actions to pro-
voke. He also makes clear that this reality is simultaneously discouraging and heartening: it 
illustrates not only that the effects of normalization are extensive, but that insofar as this is 
the case what has not been thought or imagined is equally so.53 
 
I argue that changing our practices of laughter can be a freeing askesis for feminine subjects, a 
way of expanding our capacities without increasing docility, a self-transformative ethical pro-
ject. For example, changing the way I laugh in an open and experimental manner, as I sug-
gested earlier, loosens the grip of normalization on our bodies. Intentionally using discipline 
to change my laughter habits might eventually lead to my unconscious laughter becoming 
more unpredictable. Laughing differently as a feminist askesis changes my self-relation, open-
ing me up to new possibilities of behaviour and action. I can use laughter as a tool for “influ-
encing others while (and as a part of the practice of) caring for one’s self.”54 I can directly in-
fluence them as in mocking, but subtly changing my gendered self-relation also reveals to oth-
ers that they too can participate in these transformations.  
In addition, changing laughter practices challenges essentialist models of sex and gen-
der in a transgressive way. Rather than presenting an argument against gender binaries and/or 
essentialism, the laugher undergoes a different lived experience of sex and gender. As such, 
we can view it as an everyday form of ‘genderfucking’ along with other gender-subversive 
acts.55 Thus feminist laughter practices can be seen as practices intimately involved with the 
care of the self, as askeses, as technologies of the self. When we undertake laughter as a new 
form of assujettissement, we both become different subjects and become subjects differently. 
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Through the disciplined docility of the contemporary feminine body, subjects have adapted to 
suppress transgressive laughter as quickly as possible, limiting our possibilities. I think that 
the restrictions on the laughter of women foreclose most of all transgressive laughter.  
This paper has made the case for laughter as a set of practices which merit attention 
from Foucauldian feminist theorists in particular. Foucault himself spends little time discuss-
ing laughter, and in those rare discussions he portrays it as having transgressive functions. 
However, I argue that contemporary laughter practices are both highly normalizing and high-
ly normalized. Examining the norms around laughter demonstrates their entanglement with 
our constructions of gender. Changing our laughter practices (‘laughing differently’) may 
therefore be a way to combat the subjectivation that laughter is tangled up in a form of micro-
political resistance.  
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